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1.  Introduction 
The ultimate goal of  this paper is to find a representation  of  modality compatible with 
some basic conditions on the syntax-semantic interface.' Such conditions are anchored, 
for  instance,  in  Chomsky's  (1995)  principle  of  full  interpretation  (FI).  Abstract 
interpretation of modality is, however -  be it "only"  in semantic terms -  already a hard 
nut to crack, way too vast to be dealt with  in  any comprehensive way here. What is 
pursued  instead  is  a case-study-centered  analysis. The case in  point  are the English 
modals  (EM)  viewed  in  their  development  through  time - a  locus  classicus  for  a 
number of  linguistic theories and frameworks. The idea will  be to  start out from two 
lines  of  research - continuous  grammaticalization  vs.  cataclysmic  change - and  to 
explain some of their incongruities.  The first non-trivial  point here consists in deriving 
more fundamental  questions from this research. The second, possibly even less trivial 
one consists in  answering them. Specifically, I will argue that regardless of  the actual 
numerical rate of change, there is an underlying and more structured way to account for 
the notions of change and continuity within the modal system, respectively. 
The main claim is that two primitive relations must have characterized the EM at all 
linguistically reconstructible times: central vs. non-central  coincidence. If  the spell-out 
presented  here  proves  to  be  correct, then,  in  broader- terms,  it  will  fit  Hale's  (1985) 
world  view(s). According to such  views, a principle of  coincidence with two possible 
features (central  vs.  non-central) underlies a series of prima facie  unrelated linguistic 
phenomena, as for instance locational prepositions and temporal  predicates in  (I), but 
also many others (cf. Hale 1985, Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria 2000). Starting from 
the premise of  a quantificational representation of  the EM, I will claim that there is a 
case  for  representing  modality  as  a  similar  predicate,  once  we  have  defined  the 
coincidence relations. The phrase-markers  in  (I) show that  two sets of  locations and 
times, respectively, coincide. 
'  I am indebted to Susanne Winkler for lots of patience and helping me make this paper less of  a cypher 
than  it originally was, to H. Bernhard Drubig for  pointing  out to mc more interesting  things  about 
tense and modality than I could have imagined, ((1  Michael Hegarty fol- making modality make sense 
lo me. and to Utc Wohllcbcn for proofreading thc text -  which ofcoursc docs nut entail that any of the 
shortcomings and mistakes below arc theirs in any ibrm.  '  On the semantic side of thc interface, I assume, for simplicity, the standard classification  of modality 
as exposed in Palmer (1986) and going back at least to Hofman (1976) -  in particular, this entails the 
epistemic vs. root  distinction - up to one significant difference: I  considcr alethic modality  part of 
human  language  and  not  only  of  logical  systems. Cross-linguistic back-up  for  this  view  can  be 
adduced  from Cinque's (1999: 78) study  of  functional  heads.  For English  examples - both  from 
present usage and diachronic ones -  see below. 
ZAS Papers in Ling~listics  24, 2001, 125-143 (la) locational central coincidence  (1  b) temporal central coincidcnce 
a skeleton  P'  TopT (Topic Time)  T' 
I---. 
P  ~hc  closet 
I 
in  (PRESENT as) "within"  AstT (Assertion Time) 
Turning  back  to  modality,  consider  the  sentences  in  (2), where  (2b)  would  not  be 
grammatical  today,  but  where  we  have  abundant  evidence  that  there  were  such 
sentences at earlier stages of the language, say, from Shakespearean texts. 
(2)  a.  William, you must write us a sonnet. 
(2)  b.  William, thou must to the queen. 
What  the  present  paper  attempts  to  account  for  is  an  explanation  of  why  both  a 
functional  element base  generated  in  an  inflectional  node of  the sentence (2a) and a 
lexical element generated in the verbal head (2b), can have similar interpretations at an 
interfacial  level. Both  (2a)  and  (2b) convey the notion  of  obligation, a clear case of 
deontic modality. The relation  of coincidence in  the case of modality will connect two 
sets of possible worlds. In  (2), these two sets are the one related to the speakers, or the 
commanders, and the one related to William, the commandee, respectively. Pursuing a 
slightly modified  analogy to current tense theories, I will call the first set the topical 
world set (TopW), and take it as the external argument of  the modal relation, and the 
latter  assertion  world  set  (AstW),  its  internal  argument.  The  set  TopW  does  not 
necessarily  have to be  related to the speaker, it can by  all means he related to another 
"controller"  present in discourse -  e.g. a set of possible worlds in the AstW of a higher 
clause. By contrast, in all deontics, AstW will denote the set of possible worlds related 
to  the  commandee  and  the  ordered/allowed  event  as  above.  Mutatis  nzuta~ldis,  in 
evidential or epistemics, AstW will denote the inferree and the inferred event. 
Closely linked to the representation of  modality, a further diachronic generalization 
will be  derived as the argument unfolds. Particularly, it will be argued that positing a 
Predicate Phrase (PrP or Pr,,,,)  for the whole diachronic development of  the EM from 
OE  through  ModE  is  a  refinement  of  Roberts'  (1993) sudden-diachronic-reanalysis 
theory of the modals from V to T. I will take the Pr-node to be situated between T and 
V as in Bowers (2001). In  addition to the motivation given therein  for the existence of 
PrP, I will  investigate  a further  argument for the existence  of  PrP. The argument  is 
based on VP-ellipses (Warner 1992, Winkler p.c.) in OE, which provide complementary 
evidence for Pr directly pertaining  to the predication  of  modality  (and tense). 1 will 
argue that a predicate  node has strong explanatory potential for the diachronic  issues 
dealt  with  in  this  paper.  One  benefit  of  the  tense-modality  parallelism  will  be  the 
prediction that modal verbs carry both tense and modal features which they check either 
by merger with PrP in ModE or by movement in OE/ME. From Simple Predicators Lo  Clausal Functors 
2.  Facts, theories, problems 
2.1.  The modals of English: old and new meaning 
Speakers of  ModE following their  intuitions may occasionally be  confronted with  an 
intriguing experience while  reading  OE or  ME texts  and  processing  the  semantics, 
syntax and morphology of  the precursors of may, must, shall, and can as shown in (3)- 
(7). 
(3)  We magon eow sellan balwende gepeahte, hwzet ge don magon.  (Bede, 28.12) 
we  can  you give  sound  advice, (as to) what you do may 
(4)  ...(b  at) alle Cristus wordus mote nede  be trewe.  (Wycliff, [94], 15) 
that  all  Christ's words  must necessarily be true 
(5)  ...  who this book shall wylle lerne ... 
.  .  .  he-who this book shall wish learn.. .  (Dcnison's  1993: 310 example 121) 
(6)  Method hie  ne  cupon 
Creator they not  knew 
(7)  fol.ay is betere bst  feoh bzette nzefre losian ne mreg aonne brette mzg  7 sceal. 
'therefore better is the property which can never perish [lit. never perish not 
can] than that which can and will.'  (Warner's 1992 example 5a) 
In  the linguistic space occupied by the modals, it becomes an intricate problem how to 
map an old meaning into a new one. In a translation, one and the same item can -  and in 
fact must -  be rendered in some cases by its modern correlative and in others by another 
member  of  the class as the two occurrences of  magon in  (3) make clear.'  In  (4), an 
objective  deontic  mote,  reinforced  by  the  adverbial  nede  (the  latter  originally  an 
inflected  noun  coming  close  to  instrumental  meaning)  corresponds  in  ModE  to  its 
former  preterite  form,  which  has  substituted  the  lost  present  form. Considering the 
religious context, and the additional reinforcement, mote nede turns out to have alethic 
meaning. In  (5), we understand the modal shall  more easily but at least as speakers of 
Standard ModE we are puzzled by the fact that something resembling a second modal 
comes right after it. In (6), we cannot bring the modal and the DP method together at all 
given that the pronoun  hie already checks nominative, so we  assume that cubon had 
rather the significance of knowing in this context. The comparative construction in (7) 
is noteworthy for two reasons.  First, negation  precedes the modal  meg,  and second, 
there seem to be two instances of  VP ellipsis licensed by each of the modals mceg  and 
sceul in the final relative clause. 
Direct or oblique objects (for instance with prepositions) as well as adverbials often 
give us the first clues on the meaning of the modal cognates in ME and OE. In addition 
to  this  and to  the  general  context, some approximating  translations  generally agreed 
The  necessity  of  a certain translation  cannot he  absolute; it  is rather  imposed  by the context to a 
certain exLent. For example, equating both instances of inugon with nzny  does not make the sentance 
itsel1 ungrammatical, hut semantically mostly  improbable in the context it is taken from, where it is 
essential for the spekcars to convince the addressees that they truly  are in  a position to impart some 
yond advice. Therefore curl  seems the more appropriate choice in ModE. upon  in  the literature can offer a first orientation. The following paraphrases for some 
OE premodals are for instance adapted from Traugott (1992): 
(8)  a.  magan = be strong, sufficient, in good health, be able to; especially for 
physical ability, whereas cunnan is rather used for mental faculties; 
b.  motan"'= be allowed to; be obliged to; 
c.  sculun"= owe; be necessary. 
If  we take these approximating mappings of  meaning to be correct, we have to handle 
two main  issues. How do we explain the syntactic and semantic differences to modern 
usage? And how can  we account for the OE synchronic discrepancies, notably for the 
two diametrically diverging root meanings of  motan in (8b)? A further question would 
be  whether  the  two  problems  are  interrelated.  Traugott  (1992:197)  rounds  up  the 
difficult descriptive task by giving a characterization in  terms of  the ability to express 
epistemic meaning.  In  such terms cunnan, mugan, and ugan are posited to  lack  any 
trace of epistemicity. On the other hand, mugun, sculrm, beon, and willurz are reported to 
display  some  "marginal  epistemic  colouring".  A  stronger  epistemic  coloring  is 
apparently only to be encountered amid impersonal constructions. The hint is helpful as 
a categorization, but does not answer the questions raised above. 
Visser (1969) sheds some light onto the issues by attempting to explain etymological 
links, sometimes traced back up to Indo-European. Take the two opposing meanings of 
motarz  for example. Two possibilities  are considered. The first one is that  motan of 
obligation developed out of the homonym expressing permission. The alternative story 
for the genesis of the discrepancy, and also the one preferred by Visser (pp.1791, 1797) 
is that both the permission and the obligation reading evolved from an  original "med- 
(related to  Gothic gamut) and meaning  so~nething  like  to have it measured  out for 
oneself;  to ,find  room.  However,  theoretical  backup  from  modal  logic,  and  more 
importantly, synchronic evidence from ModE show that such seemingly contradictory 
overlaps as the first possibility presented by Visser are by all means possible in  natural 
language. For instance may not and must not can still be truth-functionally equivalent in 
ModE. Furthermore, and in relation to the first co-incidence, negation of alethic must in 
ModE is taken over by cannot although can is otherwise less common as an alethic. If  it 
seems difficult to reconstruct the exact relationship between the two readings of motan 
at different stages of the language, then  it is  noteworthy that the two meanings share a 
deontic character, and we can only expect worse from the rise of epistemic readings out 
of the deontic ones. 
Traugott (1989) treats the issue of  metaphorical extension as a potential generator of 
new meaning among the modals. She does not rule such extensions out when it comes 
to the transition of one root reading to another. For instance sculan in its original form 
of  owe+DP  (e.g. debts) may have spread out metaphorically to mean owe+DPIVP (e.g. 
certain behavior). But a theory of  change from the concrete to the abstract as claimed 
for instance cross-linguistically for verbs of  perception  (a standard example being see) 
is rebuked in  the case of  the transition  from root  to epistemic modals. This rejection 
appears to be consistent with  a stronger categorial difference in the syntax of root and 
epistemic modals, respectively -  as proposed by Drubig 2001. Traugott, however, only 
mentions  a process of  "pragmatic  strengthening".  She claims a conventionalization  of 
.3  The two  starred  infinitives  arc not  attested.  Henceforth  I will  use  them  as simple props when  not 
rcrerring to any particular form in the paradigm of any of these verhs. 
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implicature,  but  the evidence presented  is  rather  scarce  and  a  clear  picture  of  how 
pragmatic strengthening might work does not arise. 
2.2.  Arguing for PrP: the syntactic and semantic shifts of the EM 
Both  Roberts  (1993)  and  Roberts  and  Roussou  (1999)  notice  that  the  different 
approaches to the diachronic development of the modals need not be at conflict as much 
as  it  seems - the  null-hypothesis  they entertain  is that  only  the focus of  research  is 
varied. Before proceeding with a closer scrutiny of this hypothesis let us review some of 
the facts. Leaving aside the issues regarding the speed of  the change and any alleged 
causality of the change, we get a visible change of grammatical status for the modals at 
the latest in  the post-Elizabethan  age (Roberts  1999: 1023 dates  it to the  1520s). The 
most conspicuous indications are given in (9). 
(9)  Changes in the modal system of English (16'~  century) 
a.  at the level  of  1-syntax: loss of  argument structure or rather loss of the 
ability  to  take  any  objects  (this  seems  to  a  facilitating,  sufficient 
condition, cf.  van  Kemenade's  1999 overview  on  the  topic,  although 
Roberts 1993 stresses its necessity). 
b.  morphological  make-up:  the  EM  had  previously  been  part  of  the 
preterite-present verb class, a morphologically distinct status, which they 
originally  shared  with  other  verbs.  The  inflectional  poverty  was 
exacerbated with loss of  2""  p. sg. (infinitives had always been rare, and 
the textual evidence even more rare; cf. OED, Visser 1969, and fn. 3) 
c.  behavior  with  respect  to  s-syntax:  most  prominent  syntactic  feature: 
alongside  have  and he, the modals  remain  unique  movables  into T  in 
ModE  after  the  1660s. Pollock's  (1989) tests  with  respect  to question 
formation, negation, and adverbs hold. 
The cataclysmic theory, which roughly states that all relevant morpho-syntactic changes 
occurred  at one point, is due mainly to Lightfoot (1979). Let  us now  briefly  review, 
what the gradual  version of grammaticalization theory says. Goosens (1 987) argues for 
instance  for  a  grammaticalization  scale  parallel  to  a  desemanticalization  process. 
Whereas Traugott, following Coates (1983), takes polysemy to be structured in terms of 
fuzzy, but distinct sets -  such as, say, the deontic and the epistemic -  Goosens favors a 
theory of  continuous transition through tlme from one meaning to another as in  (IOa) 
and (lob). 
(10)  a.  Grammaticalization Scale (Goosens 1987:  1 18) 
Full Predicates > Predicate Formation > Predicate Operators 
b.  Desemanticalization Scale (Goosens 1987: 1 18) 
Facultative > Deontic > Epistemic > Futurity, Conditionality, etc 
Full predicates are reported to be verbs with thematic structure of their own, i.e. which 
do not need an infinitive as an intermediate construction to take a DP complement. An 
example  would  be  cunnan  in  (6)  above.  Deontics  are also  included  into  this  class. 
Predicate  operators  are  defined  as  verbal  forms  lacking  an  independent  thematic 
structure and used  for functional  purposes,  i.e. possessing  a temporal  or conditio~lal character. Should, will, and would in  ModE would be typical examples. Such a binary 
distinction would correspond to a wide-spread taxonomy of main vs. auxiliary verbs, or 
more generally,  to  one distinguishing  functional  vs. lexical  categories.  The question, 
however,  arises  whether  there  was  an  intermediate  stage of  predicate  formation  and 
which verbs it contained. Goosens (1987) defines the items belonging at some point to 
such a putative group as a class containing verbs  which do not assign argument roles 
and takes epistemics to be a prototypical member. This choice is not too fortunate, as 
the investigator  himself  recognizes. Goosens seems to be on the right  track  here, but 
there is one important amendment to be made. I will argue that a predicational phrase 
PrP in  its  own  right  and  extant  at  all  stages of  the  language is the  least  stipulatory 
solution for the diachronic development and for synchronic variation. 
Even if continuity as proposed by Goosens is probably not be the ultimate answer to 
the  transitions  in  the  modal  system,  the  idea  of  incremental  loss  of  meaning 
accompanied by  an  increasingly  outstanding  grammatical  status  has  more  than  just 
intuitive appeal and it will be specified less idiosyncratically and with more explanatory 
potential in  due course. The idea of  rapid reanalysis  A la Lightfoot (1979), elegant as it 
may  be,  also  has  a  number  of  critical  points.  First  and  foremost,  there  is  a  hard 
theoretical  problem. Given that within this scenario we would account for reananlysis 
within the range of one generation, the following question comes to mind: Is a learner's 
internal  grammar  sufficient  to  account  for  historic  change?  If,  in  accordance  with 
standard  assumptions  about  UG,  children  are  always  able  to  recover  the  parents' 
grammar from their  output, which is occasionally defective and never complete, then 
we should not get syntactic diachronic change at  Second, despite the obvious fact 
that the EM system has restructured in a number of ways (magan is generally expressed 
by  modern can, cunnan by  modern  know; arise of  epistemics), such basic  notions as 
volition, obligation  (and margillally  epistemicity in  magun, sculan, beon, and willm, 
according to Traugott 1992) are expressed within the system from OE through ~od~.' 
Granted the various shifts of the modal class from within, how are we to account for the 
overall still class-internal transmission of these basic semantic notions? A third problem 
is the need for an explanation of  the semantic conditions on grammaticalization. It is 
standardly  assumed  that  grammaticalization  of  lexemes  goes  hand  in  hand  with 
bleaching  (see  van  Kemenade  1999). Is  then  bleaching just  an  unstructured  loss  of 
meaning  formed  around  phonological  material?  If  not,  what  is  then  the  common 
semantic skeleton around which so-called bleaching occurs? One argument of this paper 
is that Pr is precisely in charge of this skeleton from the point of  view of  interpretable 
features. Fourth, the lexical roots of  the core modals have remained generally the same: 
the examples (3) through (7) display just  a very restricted sample. If  the verbal nuclei 
' The case ol  creolcs and  language contact is  trivially different  since children  reconstruct the closest 
possihle  approximation  of  a  grammar  if  the  output  they  get  is  non-consistent.  Some problematic 
aspects of thc i-eanalysis  approach arc also reviewed in Kroch (2001). 
KPIOW  is one of the few exceptions, where a meaning previosly expressed within the system has been 
puslied out of it. In fi~ct,  thcre is an i~iteresling  developlncnt ofkrrnw in the immeditr post-Elizabethan 
pcriod notcd in  Gel-gel (2000). Although llistorically not belonging to the prleritc-present class, much 
less heing a premodal in the sense of Lightfoot (1979). know may have been  "wrongly mapped"  into 
the class of vcrbs still undergoing verb movement (i. e, in good company of  the modals) at a time 
whcn do-support was already the overwhelming rule and not the exception (cf. Ellegal-d 1953, Roherts 
1991). An amazing exemplification of  this fact can be found in the diary of Samuel Pepys. In Gergel 
(2000) the explanation goes as follows: Being semantically a verb expressing modality (both dynamic 
and cvidcntial, depending on context) the verb know has initially also been  tricked  into joining the 
same syntax as the other, "cstablished" modals. From Simple Predicators to Clausal Functors 
are the same, then  we might wonder  whether  a cataclysmic reanalysis  from a purely 
lexical status (V) to a fully functional head position (T) might have occurred overnight. 
A final problem is the following: Admitted the morphological change of the modals (e. 
g loss of 2"* sg. ending at the beginning of the l6Ih century, cf. Arnold 1995: 69, loss of 
gerunds and  infinitives) once we look closer  in any pre-theoretical  syntactic terms, it 
turns out that in many cases (we are glossing over double modals here) it were more the 
other verbs' co-occurrence properties changing (e.g, no verb movement after the 1660s) 
than  those of  the modals  (e.g. appearance in  subject-verb inversions both  before  and 
after Shakespeare). 
In  addition, Warner  (1992)  argues  for a  special  auxiliary-wordclass  status  of  the 
modals as early as OE based on impersonal constructions and ellipses. This evidence, 
drawing on various additional corpora as well, poses  a problem for what we may call 
the classical V-to-I reanalysis theory as it stands. An overall dyadic shape of modality - 
whether in T or in V-  may contribute to our understanding of the continuity in terms of 
syntactic auxiliaryhood. Moreover, the fact that the modals could engage into licensing 
verbal  ellipses just  as  in  modern  usage  (see Warner's  discussion  for  viable  criteria 
distinguishing genuine ellipses from cases of argument reduction) forces us  to posit a 
functional head position  above the omitted verb phrase, but also below negation. That 
is,  sentences  like  (7) are  direct  evidence  for  a  structure  as  [TP[NegP[PrP[(VP)]]]], 
where the modal can license the omitted VP from the head position within PrP. 
In  sum, if  we want to depart from the behaviorist null-hypothesis and entertain the 
admittedly more interesting UG-view of perfect language acquisition, then we should be 
able to come up with  a more refined account of  modality in  our particular case. The 
interesting  alternative  hypothesis  we  want  to pursue  is  furthermore also notoriously 
known  to hold  true  in the general  case:  Syntax is significantly more change-resistant 
than the other language modules. 
Motivated by  the historical  issues mentioned  above, we  also obtain  the following 
more general questions : 
(i) Is  a  discrete  notion  of  syntactic category  tenable for the English  modalsl for 
~nodals  and modality in  general given  the variation  of  syntactic height  as observed by 
reanalysis  advocates?  From  a  GB  model  of  language,  an  affirmative  answer  seems 
desirable. From a minimalist computational perspective, even inore so. 
(ii) Assuming there is such a discrete category, what is its representation? Moreover 
where is it situated within the clausal domain? Is it to be assumed around V as in OE or 
rather in T as in ModE? 
(iii) How does syntactic representation correlate with semantic interpretation? How 
come both OEfME and ModE modals -  although in syntactic terms generally different - 
map onto the same modal semantic structure at LF? 
(iv) A  further question pertaining to the modals is their relationship to predication 
processes  (i.e.  saturation  of  properties  as in  Chierchia  1985 inter alia).  Are  the  EM 
predicates in any sense'?  Or are they -  at least partly -outside  the propositional domain? 
(McDowell 1987 and Drubig 2001 claim T-status for deontics and a C-related position 
for epistemics.) 
By  concluding from the evidence adduced in  this  section that  Pr is present in the 
clause, we can disentangle the problem of  where the modality features are located and 
where they must be checked from the issue of  different modal base-generating sites at 
different  stages of  the language. Both in  pre-modern  and  in  present  usage of English, 
the  interpretable  tense  and modality  features  are  checked  in  the predicational  node. 
Thereby  the  issues  raised  above  would  be  solved  in  a  straightforward  way.  The representation of  modality is on this view indeed discrete, its interpretation is regulated 
via the interpretable (hence non-deletable) features in  Pr, and modality and predication 
work in quite similar ways. The checking processes will be explained in more detail in 
4.1  and  4.2. What remains to  be  done is in  fact an  account for the precise types of 
features involved in the predication of modality. 
3.  A characterization of the EM in terms of semantics and syntax 
3.1.  A sample semantic basis for the modals (Mc Dowell 1987) 
One of  the  main  claims of  the present  investigation  is  that  modal  predicates  have  a 
dyad~c  nature  with  essent~ally  two  feature  specifications.  Positing  binary  feature 
specifications for the English modals means that this duality corresponds to their actual 
distribution.  I  will  base  my  argument  on  McDowell  (1987),  a  study  which  shows 
precisely  such a distribution based on an item-by-item inspection conducted for most of 
the EM. Let us see how her methods work for must, a representative which turns out to 
display a deonticlepistemic ambiguity in  sentences as (1 la) with the two paraphrased 
readings (I lb) and (I lc). 
(I I)  a.  John must be a Democrat 
b.  (Necessarily) John is a Democrat 
c.  John is forced/commanded/obliged to be a Democrat 
Negation takes wide scope in both readings, as it can easily be checked. Regardless of 
the correlation existing between  the various readings of other modals and the scope of 
negation,  this  single  counterexample  shows  that  testing  for  scope  cannot  generally 
disambiguate  the  readings.  The  essence  of  the  tests  for  ambiguity  used  instead  is 
rendered in (12) and (13). 
(1 2)  For p and q to be ambiguous, p~q  has to be grammatical and non-redundant. 
(1 3)  For p and q to be ambiguous, pn~q  has to be true (i.e. not a contradiction). 
To  illustrate  this  consider  substituting the  afore-mentioned  sentence  (I l b)  by  p and 
(1 lc) by q. Then the two tests give a positive answer concerning ambiguity. It is worth 
bearing in mind that (I lb) and (I lc) share the same core proposition  (cp) John be a 
Democrat. If the first reading of (I la), i.e. the epistemic one, quasi-asserts the cp, what 
does the second, deontic one do to  it? Since we do not have any other options in the 
framework proposed  by  McDowell, we  would (theoretically) expect (I lb) to quasi or 
fully  assert  it - these  being  the  two  main  illocutionary  acts  used  in  her  study. 
Practically,  it  is self-evident that neither  is the case. McDowell  argues that  it  (fully) 
asserts a proposition  as (14),  i.e. an entirely new proposition, obtained from the same 
core, and therefore related, but not identical to the original. 
(14)  There exists althe command [ that ..(cp)..]. 
Following the line of  research  along the concepts of  assertion  and quasi-assertions  in 
more detail, one gets a useful machinery to distinguish between epistemics and deontics 
pragmatically, but a common denominator for modality in general is not to be expected. 
Such  a  generalization  can  instead  be  given - with  a few  caveats - via Lewis'  well From Simple Predicators lo Clausal Functors 
known model of  possible worlds. The following overview is adapted from McDowell 
(1987: 195) and shall only be used as a fix point to illustrate a number of general facts 
about the EM. 
(15)  Worlds and quantifiers for the English nlodals 




There are two conspicuous entries we might miss from this table. McDowell posits the 
non-existence of  English duals in the case of  cun and should as quantifiers over K and 
N, respectively.  The universal  counterpart  in  the  case of  compatibility  is speculated 
upon  along  the  lines  of  a  predicate  as  incwituble. Certainly,  most  readings  of  must 
occurring in English do not convey this meaning as it becomes clear from the foregoing 
discussion  - i.e.  they  are  epistemic  or,  in  its  root  meaning,  subjective  deontic. 
Nonetheless, it appears that alethic must comes very close to it. 
Inserting the universal quantifier to check this reading -  in McDowell's framework - 
we obtain: For the set K of compatible worlds the triple (s, p, K) is true iff for all w E 
K, w E p. So the theory of  quantification sustains such a claim too. As for the dual of 




(16)  a.  After such an accident, exchanging phone numbers is the least you could 
do. 
b.  After  the accident last night, giving me her phone number would have 




The  normative  character  paralleling  should  is  intuitively  clear,  and  could  easily  be 
double-checked logically. There are two possible reasons why this duality may not have 
been considered. Could is not included into the main classification in  McDowell, but is 
rather derived  via its affinity to can. However, with all due attention paid to the still 
existing correlation  between  the two related  forms, it seems that could has earned  its 
autonomous status among the English modals in  numerous  contexts.'  The fact that  it 




6  The only reason 1 am considering a pseudo-cleft structure with a preposed circumstantial PP is that it 
secms to convey the normative meaning in a marc straightforward ,  i.e. non-ambiguous way.  Except 
for the fact that one would have to disambiguate again, there is no other reason against any other non- 
clef1 pattern.  '  For  instancc in  (I ha) we  may substitute  can for corrld, and there is no resulting temporal shift. The 
reason why 1 suggested c<,ulrl instead ol'cun as a completion 111 .shoulrl in McDowell's model is that 
in (I6h) the same substitution makes the sentence ungra~nmatical.  One could ol  course argue for cun 
as the real countel.pal-t in  normative contexts hy claiming roulrl in  (Ihh) as its inflectional form. At 
any rate the issue would  have to be investigated morc thoroughly than can he done here. The point 1 
am rnaking ahout the prescnce of an existential normative modal in English would he valid in either of 
the two cases. 





bf A  more  serious  objection  would  be  that  the  two  examples  (16a), (16b)  should be 
pragmatically  derived  from  the  fairly  broad  sense  of  operator  of  compatibility  of 
cun/could.  In  fact,  even  though  this  objection  is justified,  it  may  even  be  slightly 
misplaced as such, since it 
can be raised to a more general criticism of the model of possible worlds -  at least in the 
present  version. Compatibility (K) may be too general  as a term,  so that  almost  any 
other possible worlds would also fall under its domain, i.e. not only the normative (N) 
as represented  by  could and should, but  also F, and possibly also C and W".  On the 
other  hand,  if  we  accept  the  division  into  worlds  as  done  by  McDowell,  then  a 
completion of (15) as noted above holds. Moreover, the classification is not extensive 
either. To name just one possible gap consider the well-known quantificational readings 
of  some modals. 
(17)  Cocktail parties can be boring 
(17) is mentioned and quickly done away with in  McDowell as a "sporadic aspectual" 
(p.142).  This misses  the point that  such a reading would have to  be considered in  a 
quantificational approach before any other since it represents quantification per se, i.e. 
without  an  apparent  additional  restriction  besides  the  explicit  one where  the  set of 
cocktail parties is the restrictor. An LF equivalent would be (I  8). 
(18)  Some cocktail parties are boring. 
(19)  Generally,  a spouse will  have a car. That way you  will  have two cars in  the 
Family.  (fi-om an AFN radio-show on " Reasons lo get married") 
Now consider (19), where will seems to complement the quantificational reading of can. 
Here, the intended meaning  is not existential as in  (18). Furthermore  it  is neither  the 
common future interpretation nor a "bare"  quantificational interpretation as paraphrased 
in  (20a) and (20b) respectively. 
(20)  a.  At some interval in the future, the event [a spouse have a car] holds. 
b.  Every spouse has a car. 
If  the  presence  of  will  in  (19)  is  to  fit  a  quantificational  schema for  modals,  and 
particularly to take over as the universal quantifier where can works as the existential in 
(17), then  we  need  an  additional  restriction. This restriction  is indeed present  in  the 
sentence as an adverb, namely gener~ll~.~  The prediction that under the consideration of 
this restriction, will operates as V is borne out in (21) which correctly paraphrases (19). 
(2  1)  In the general case, every spouse has a car. 
Can also fits this slightly restricted scheme, and is at any rate the weaker form of  the 
two modals. Thus one may  consider  will  and cun as duals in  a traditional sense and 
thereby extend the table (I 5) by one column with the heading, say, G for generic modal 
quantification. 
"CF.  Cinque  (1999)  fix  thc  exact  synractic  relationship  betwecn  adverbs  and  functional  heads  as 
carriers of modality  in  the sentence: specifier-head. 
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Having filled a gap in McDowell's model both within its own categories -  with could as 
dual for should in normative readings -  and by extending it by one additional category, 
we may  still be far away from an  extensive classification of  the modals. Besides, the 
absence of mutual exclusiveness has also been  mentioned.%onetheless,  the semantic 
contribution made by classifications of this kind, and also the methods applied deserve 
to  be  kept  in  mind  for their  strong general  character. The  main  result  is the  binary 
modeling schema for the EM. 
There are  also serious linguistic  and  psycholinguistic  factors  which  show  that  an 
opposed-features concept  (binarity)  is  close to  the empirical  facts  of  naturalness  in 
human language."  I remain neutral with respect to such general claims, the crucial point 
for the scope of  this paper being the striking binary nature of  the EM, which shall be 
translated  with  the  notions of  central and non-central  coincidence. The way  this two 
dual  notions  are presently  understood  in  the  literature  (Hale  1985, Demirdache  and 
Uribe-Etxebarria  2000)  makes  them  more  appropriate  as  tools  than  a  strict 
quantificational approach to the modals. In section 4 we will take up this idea again and 
claim it to be a close approximation on the conditions reigning at the syntax-semantics 
interfacial processing of modality. 
3.2.  Additional semantics with respect to diachrony: 
a visibility parameter 
Bybee, Perkins  and  Pagliuca  (1994:176)  propose  that  we  should give up finding the 
right  semantic definition  for modality  within  synchronic frameworks altogether.  The 
alternative  argued for is that  "mood  is best  viewed  as  a set of  diachronically related 
functions, and ... a real  understanding of  modality would emerge from a study of  these 
diachronic relations". 
This  strong claim  about  the role  of  change in  language for the understanding  of 
modality  shall  not  be  represented  here.  More  than  anything  else,  modality  is  a 
synchronically present phenomenon affecting both the truth values of the utterances it is 
involved in and the syntactic structure (merging into the T-node) in ModE and probably 
in  more ways  than  we can find out at all stages of  the language. However, there is a 
practical point to be made here, without any claim about its being a definition. We may 
call it diuchronic visibility,  and maintain it simply as an observation and working tool. 
(22)  The diachronic visibility function 
The  predicational  relations  instantiated  by  the  EM  are  a  function  of  their 
diachronic development, which can be evaluated at all synchronic stages. 
3.3.  A minimalist glimpse at EM syntax 
Following  Lightfoot  (1979),  Roberts  (1993,  and  previous  research),  Roberts  and 
Roussou  (1999)  recast  the  lexical-to-functional  reanalysis  theory  for  the  n~odals  in 
minimalist  terms. The crucial syntactic point  is, however. still the same as in  Roberts 
"  For  a more thorough  discussion of  the possible-worlds  approach,  accessibility, and  also of related 
problems cf Lewis (I 986). 
''  Cf. JackendoR (1990) for a more skeptical view concerning binary modelling, at least with respect to 
certain conceptual structures which according to him seem to he harder to classify in hinary terms, but 
sce Dressler 2000 for a recent  oveview on naturalness  and  the claim that hinary  structures underly 
language conceptualization. (1993): due to their zero-inflection and to the loss of the infinitive they were taking as a 
complenient, the modals reanalyzed from V to T. In  fact Roberts (1993) already has a 
strong minimal-effort  motivation - in  terms of  traces  saved by  such an  analysis. The 
facilitating factors considered are: the morphological loss of  the subjunctive, the opacity 
of  tense, especially on epistemic modals (cf. might in ModE), and as we have already 
seen, the  loss  of  thematic  argument  structure. The bottom  line of  the  new  economy 
considerations is that merge is the preferred  operation over move: Whereas in  OEIME 
the strong feature of T in  English was satisfied by  movement, in  ModE it came to be 
satisfied by merger of  one of  the brand-new reanalyzed  items belonging to the modal 
class. The criticism raised in 2.2 above still holds. Even though the syntactic reanalysis 
is undeniable, there are many issues relating to continuity within this theory which ask 
for an explanation. 
4.  The primitive elements of modality 
4.1.  Central vs. non-central coincidence in modal metric 
In  this  section the binary  semantic classification of  the EM (section 3.1 .) and the dia- 
chronic reanalysis (2.2. and 3.3.) are claimed to correlate with a syntactic representation 
of   nodality  as  abstract  predication  in  terms  of  features  of  central  and  non-central 
coincidence. The diachronic visibility function is be taken as corroborative evidence. 
The answer to the questions about the EM raised in  section 2 can be completed by 
considering a  decomposition  into primitive  elements of  modal  semantics and  syntax. 
This can be done in a manner related to current analyses of  tense and aspect (e.g. as 
exposed in  Stowell  1996, Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria  2000),  by  means  of  two 
adposition-like abstract dyadic predicates.  The crucial difference will be to understand 
the non-linearity  of  modality and hence the different meaning of  the otherwise similar 
predicates of central and non-central  coincidence. More precisely, I will argue that the 
primitives of modality are modeled by human language close to AFTER  and W~HIN,  but 
that this two prepositions are to be understood with respect to a modal metric This is the 
main problem with many accounts trying to bring modality onto the same denominator 
with tense: more often than not, they get the right structural  similarity, but neglect the 
different  semantic  metric  which  underlies  tense  and modality,  respectively  (Patridou 
2000, Gergel 2000). 
Different  kinds  of  spatio-temporal  relationship  have  often  been  invoked  in  the 
literature. It should be noted, however, that even for the simple translation from time to 
space (i.e. without even dealing with possible worlds or any other approach to modality 
yet)  the  analogy  fails  unless  space  is  seen  as  on  an  one-dimensional  line,  which 
corresponds to  Hale's (1985) "trajectory."  There is for instance no general metric for 
establishing which of two pairs of two-dimensional co-ordinates is the bigger and which 
one the smaller one -  the real numbers are an ordered set, the complex ones are not, as 
math will have it. With time, however, since it is an ordered one-dimensional set, AFTER 
and WITHIN  make sense, in  fact, even more straightforwardly than with locations -  i.e. 
where the analogy has originally been taken from -  where we have the one-dimension 
restriction as above. 
In  order  to  illustrate  the  distinction  with  respect  to  syntactic  representation  and 
semantic interpretation, let us assume three co-ordinates of meaning for any given truth- 
functional  calculus.  So we  shall  consider  triples  <s,  w,  t>,  where  s  stands  for  the 
speaker, w for the world, and t  is the time the proposition is to be evaluated at. While From Simple Predicators to Clausal Functors 
the variable t seems to behave linearly in our conceptualization of language, w does not, 
so we need  a different  feature for modality. Building  on  the possibility of  modeling 
most modals as duals of some other modal, I argue that the computational system CHL 
only  has  to  read  off  the lexical  entry  which  feature  should  be  fed  into  the Pr-node 
(central or non-central  coincidence). This can  be  done from different  locations in the 
syntactic phrase marker as the diachronic visibility function reassures us. The following 
representation sums up the main ideas. 
One is tempted to introduce the constraints Predicate Tense and Predicate Modality as a 
generalization  independent  of  the  diachronic  development  of  the  language.  Its 
fulfillment is, however, parametrically different for present usage and pre-Elizabethan 
registers. 
(23)  The modals of English -General  syntactic schema 
6odE  modals arc merged  here  in> 
4.2.  Two scenarios for expressing modality in English 
Trnax 
4.2.1.  A modal enters the numeration in ModE 
the  derivation  and  check  the  two 
features  in  the  Pr-projection  by 
In  minimalist vocabulary, we might say that an  item modal (may, must, etc.) will be 
base-generated in T (following the insight from Roberts  1993), and it will eventually be 
mapped  to LF in  the conglomerate of  the final syntactic object with  a feature matrix 
containing similarly designed, but distinct, entries for tense and modality. I take central 
coincidence as the  non-marked  value  both  for tense and for modality. For tense, this 
means  that  PRESENT  yields  the  unmarked  ("minus")  interpretation  for TENSE,  while 
necessity (NEC) yields the unmarked interpretation for modality. This double prediction 
is indeed borne out  in natural language. On the one hand, not only do we not have a 
present operator in  intensional logic, but present tense is morphologically unmarked in 
English, and also tends to go unmarked  in many other languages.  On the other hand 
propositions  which  are  necessarily  true  are  also left  unmarked  in  English  and  other 
languages.  The clearest case of  this phenomenon  is  represented  by  alethic modality, 
TopT ,----I 
merger  of  their  own  TIM  features 
TopW 
----I 
Spec Pr  Pr'  merged  here  and  check 
[lie  relevant  Pr-features 
by  feature  movement  of 
their  lexical  TM entries 
to the Pr-node 
Predicate Tense!  SpecV  V' 
Predicate Modality! 
T=+/- (non-centnor ce~ztr  co-inc)  AstW 
M=+/-  (non-centr.or centr co-incj which  for instance in  the reading of  "&-necessity."  can  optionally be  left out or 
inserted. Thus two plus  two must equal four  is truth-functionally equivalent to two plus 
two -  equuls four.  The modal entry in  the feature matrix of  modul will be otherwise 
free to be epistemic, deontic, and what not, depending on the finer specification of the 
predicational head. In  standard dialects of English it will be, however, unique. This is a 
clearly syntactic, not a semantic constraint (uniqueness of the T position). 
4.2.2.  A "modal" verb entering an English derivation long time ago (in OEME) 
The same specifications with  respect to markedness hold. Take central-coincidence  as 
unmarked. Just as in  the previous case, it will  have different meaning at LF for tense 
and modality, but it will go through the syntactical machinery, Chomsky's (1995) CHL, 
in  the  same guise.  As  a  dyadic  predicational  structure. With  respect  to  modality  it 
relates the topic w-variable to the assertion w-variable. Stowell (1996) proposes a very 
similar procedure  for tense  as  a  (cross-linguistic) abstract predicate. The predication 
process itself is the same as in  modern times, Pr being in charge. We can predicate tense 
and  modalities  via  merger  with  Pr - once the  full  VP merges  with  the  Pr-head  the 
relevant features will be checked and will not be deleted since they are all interpretable 
at the interface to LF. The parametric difference is accounted for in syntactic terms: The 
base-generating host of modul is different on the two scenarios. However, it can get into 
a  checking  relationship  with  Pr  in  both  cases.  Also  parametrically  different  is  the 
following fact: We do not get the uniqueness constraint in  this scenario on modal items, 
since the premodals now come from VP and interact with PrP "from below" -  while T 
was unique per clause above, V is not, i.e. multiple premodal  strings are predicted, and 
there are such cases attested (see sentence 3 for one). 
We may  now  see for a moment  whether central  and non-central  co-incidence  can 
also be  made sense of  intuitively. As a diacritic, we can  take the unmarked value of 
central coincidence to have the approximate meaning of  WITHIN.  In the case of  tense, 
WJTHIN  means  that  the assertion time  is within the topic time. With aspect, which is, 
roughly  speaking, an  embedded tense, it means that  the assertion time  is within  the 
event  time,  in  which  case  we  get  the  progressive.  With  modality,  we  only  get  the 
structural parallelism of dyadic predicate if we are not oblivious with regard to the co- 
ordinate we are dealing with. Therefore, while the notion  of  topic time is now  fairly 
wide-spread in the literature (Klein  1994), there are good reasons to make a concept of 
topic world just as fashionable. Just as with time, it can be influenced by discourse or by 
an embedding context. It will simply be the external al-gurnent of our celebrated dyadic 
predicate."  For  an  embedded clause, it is controlled by  the event time of  the higher 
clause. In  the case of a matrix clause, is controlled by the set of worlds involved in the 
speech  act. This  too  follows closely  the  parallelism  to  tense  pointed  out  in  Stowell 
(1996). 
Furthermore, there are lexical indications for the realization of the abstract predicate 
of  coincidence  from  prepositional  phrases  in  intensional  adverbial  expressions  in  a 
number of languages.12 At this juncture, Cinque's (1999) correlation of  adverbials and 
I I  Stowell  (1990)  rnakcs  a  si~nilar  point  with  respect  to  time.  Stowell's terminology  makes  use  of 
"rclercnce Limc" for such a titlie which can he controlled either by discourse (default option) or by an 
embedding context. I refrain  from this term since it may causc confusion with Reichenbach's  (1947) 
refbrence point R -  fiom which it is radically different. 
" 1 makc use of  the term adverbial as a syntactic objecl following Mc Cawley (1995) -  where adverb 
w<)uld  be just the more restricted, morphological term. Frorn Simple Predicators Lo  Clausal Functors 
functional  projections  can  be  observed  to  work.  Adverbials  and  (modal) functional 
heads  are  in  in  a position  of  functors  semantically,  and  following  Cinque also in  a 
syntactic Spec-Head relation. For instance, in  English  we have an  (evidential) modal 
adverbial  such  as in  x's opinion, i.e. modeled  with  the closest lexical preposition  of 
central coincidence. On the other hand, in  the German x's Meinung nach (x's-opinion- 
ufier-)  evidentiality has been lexicalized as non-central coincidence. 
A further piece of  evidence for the dyadic nature of modal predicates can be adduced 
from the syntax of  quasi-modals. Among other researchers Harley (1995) stresses the 
prepositional  nature of  have. The foundation for this fact is both internal-syntactic and 
cross-linguistic, many  languages  (in  fact  the  majority)  lacking possessive  verbs  and 
replacing  them  by  prepositional  constructions  (here  we  may  take  the  dative  as 
prepositional too). However, it also turns out that numerous languages express different 
modalities by using something close to have (see for instance the overviews in Bybee et. 
al.  1994). As  a matter of  fact, one does not  have to  look  too  far for an  illustration. 
English  makes use of have to as  a quasi-modal, in  particular  as a supletive form for 
13  t~zust.  I take this to be further evidence for the dyadic (abstract) argument structure of 
modality. The role of  to may prove crucial, too, indeed. In  a number of  other English 
quasi-modals such as he to, this element is also available. Here the suggestion can be 
made that  to  enlarges the otherwise poorer  argument structure of he  in  English  (only 
one, internal, argument following Harley  1995) and makes it suitable for the syntactic 
configuration  of  modality,  i.e. it  makes  it  a dyadic relation  between  the  set of  topic 
worlds and that of the assertion worlds. 
Cross-linguistically, let us mention only one more celebrated case of preposition-like 
element becoming a marker of modality. Latin -  at different times -  is known to have 
had both the prepositional possessive (mihi est= "to me (there) is" = "I have")  and the 
verb habeo (="I  have").  It is worth  repeating that both  semantically and syntactically 
they  can  be  regarded  as parallel.  In  most Western  Romance dialects  habeo became 
grammaticalized  as  a  marker  of  futurity.  Interestingly, in  a  second  step the  futurity 
morpheme also came to express (epistemic) modality, e.g.  in  Spanish. Summing this 
story of indirect evidence up, a dyadic "have"  became a marker of dyadic modality via 
dyadic tense. 
4.3.  Tense and modality 
Keeping the different metrics in mind, we still get an ordering process according to two 
main  relationships  in  both  cases.  This  means  that  modality  and  tense  possess  very 
similarly engineered mechanisms in  grammar. If  true, this may be due to an economy- 
driven constraint. However, the principle of FI proves strong enough to require the entry 
for both categories, that is, in the proposal argued for here through the mediation of the 
predicating node. For instance, in  John may leave the modal feature is marked as non- 
central  coincidence  (recall  that  may  can  be  rendered  by  the  existential  3,  and  we 
translated this as non-central coincidence), while the tense feature is non-marked, alias 
PRESENT, alias central-coincidence. 
Just like with  tense, only one feature is obligatory per clause. If  there is a further, 
embedded tense in  a clause than this can be aspect. If  there is a second modality, then 
this  is non-alethic,  and  non-epistemic.  That  leaves us with the result  that tense is to 
"  Fnr  a detailed  semantic and  pragmatic  discussion of  the quasi-modals in  relationship to  the core- 
mndals, see Westney (1995). aspect what epistemic and alethic modality are to deontics and more generally to root 
modals,  a  rough  generalization  given  the differences  between  the two variables,  hut 
which holds at least in terms of embedding and necessity per clause. 
Given the non-linear relationship within modal systems as opposed to tense systems, 
we will not necessarily expect a full parallel to a con.recutio temporun? rule, which, in 
essence, is a morphological  linear back-shifting process to  a fake morphological past 
standing for a syntactic PRESENT (notation as in  Stowell  1996). Surprisingly enough, 
we do get a shift  with  respect to evidentiality in  the mood  system  of  German. After 
verbs  of  saying  Standard  German  requires  the  subjunctive  mood  (a  rather  rough 
translation  for  Konjunktiv).  By  using  the  structural  parallelism  above  saying  tense: 
aspect = epistemicPalethic: deontic, we can predict the restriction that only a subset of 
evidential  verbs  can  trigger  the  shift  to  the  subjunctive in  their  complement clause. 
Recall that in English it is the tense of the higher clause and not its aspect which triggers 
the  morphological  back-shift  rule. By  the  same token,  in  German  it  is  the  episteme 
fcature (or at least a subset thereof) which triggers  the Konjlmktiv, the shifted type of 
mood.'4 Once we rely on  Palmer's  (1986) views that mood  is a grammatical reflex of 
modality it becomes clear that we are dealing with morphologically shifted modality - 
so the phenomenon might be close to a consecutio rnodorum - where all the warnings 
afore-mentioned still hold that a consecutio is hard to make sense of for modality in the 
first place . 
5.  Conclusion 
The present account had the objective of shedding some light onto the history of the EM 
including  the  modern  stages  of  the  standard  dialects.  The  key-tools  have  been  two 
simple  devices:  First,  the  relational  nature  of  modality  and  the  existence  of  a 
predicational node at all recorded stages of English. Second, the prepositional nature of 
any modal node. In  particular, the Pr-head  has  been  supported by  semantic arguments 
starting off from the dual nature of  most modals in English in  section 3.1. By  viewing 
meaning  as  a function  with  a three-coordinate  domain  (s, t, w) and  with  an  eye on 
theories of  tense, I have investigated an adaptation of such theories from the second to 
the third variable pointing out to significant differences, but also to striking similarities, 
which  have given  support to a generalization of  Stowell's (1996) concept of  abstract 
predicates. Further evidence for the idea of the relational nature of modality consisted in 
applying Harley's (1 995) account of have to quasi-modals such as huve to. 
The hypothesis concerning the existence of the predicational projection  assumed the 
syntactic work reviewed in  Bowers (2001) complemented by four pillars of diachronic 
evidence. First, a uniform  syntactic form and  locus have been  given to the relational 
nature of  modality.  Second, Roberts'  (1993) reanalysis  theory  has been  taken up and 
refined  both  syntactically  and  with  respect  to  interface  interpretation  through  the 
predicational phrase. Third, some criticism of the Lightfootian  theory has equally been 
accommodated  and  systematized  (for  instance  Goosens'  1987  conjecture  about 
predicate  formation). Fourth,  data from Warner  (1992)  concerning  elliptical  VPs  as 
I4  Clearly there are radically  different types  of mood  and mood-selection, e.g. the English  mandative 
subjunctive,  or the  suh.iunctive  in  Spanish,  which  cannot  be dealt with  here. Whether they  pose  a 
problem for the prescnt account or whether the two systems can be modelled so that they ultimately 
converge, is for further research to find out. From Simple Predicators to Clausal Functors 
early as in OE have suggested the need for a syntactic licensing head position above the 
elided VP and also strictly below negation since the OE modals are generally preceded 
by negation. 
Moreover, a  framework for discussing both epistemic and deontic modality  in  the 
vein of the frameworks able to deal with grammatical aspect and tense at the same time 
has  been  put  forth  by  using  cross-categorial  features.  The  schema  proposed  here 
explains to a certain  extent different grammaticalizations of  modality,  since the older 
and more recent forms of English can be regarded as different parametric options for 
UG. Using the two main concepts proposed here, we may have an idea why modality 
and tense often ride on the same vehicles (cf. the samples in Bybee et. al. 1994, and for 
a  quick  check-up,  simply the  modals  in  English).  Related  to this,  we also have an 
account for why certain  lexemes often change from tense to modality and vice versa 
such as English  will, originally  a  volitional  marker of  root modality, today mostly a 
futurity and epistemicity marker. This is precisely supported by the related design of the 
two ~~ecifications.'~  Although not explored here, I suspect that the proposal  made here 
is able to handle counterfactuality, as a special combination of mood and tense, a view 
compatible with the approach advocated in Iatridou (2000).lh 
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